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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

JESSE ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal From Third District Court, Salt Lake County
Honorable 1\L J. Bronson, Judge

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATE!JENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, Jesse Anderson, was convicted by
a jury in the District Court of the Third Judicial
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
for having committed the crime of involuntary
manslaughter. The defendant has appealed to this
Court from that conviction.
The statement of the case and of the facts as set
forth by counsel for the appellant in appellant 'R
brief, is, in the main, correct, and for that reason
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we will dispense herein with any statement of the
facts except as we refer to them in argument.
.Counsel for the defendant has assigned numerous
errors, 39 in all; but in his brief he combines them
under eight headings and nine different points or
questions for argument. A number of assignments
are made by defendant, charging the court with
error in the admission of certain evidence and in
the failing to sustain objections made by the defendant to certain questions. The defendant has
not argued these assignments except with respect
to the evidence connected with the hypothetical
question submitted to the expert. The defendant
by failing to argue these assignments has waived
any claim to error he may have in connection with
them. We will, therefore, direct our argument
solely to the questions argued by the defendant
under the nine subheadings in his brier.

ARGUMENT NUMBER I.
On pages 6 to 8 of defendant's brief, counsel contends that the complaint, which was originally filed
before the magistrate upon which the preliminary
hearing was based, was not sufficient to charge the
defendant with a crime and did not s'ta!te facts
sufficient to advise the defendant of the naturr
and cause of the accusation against him. Counsel
cites the case of State v. Gesas, 49 Utah 181; 16:l
Pac. 366, to the effecf that an information must
state "the particular circumstances of the offense"
and that under such a ·case the original complaint,
as filed herein, failed to state sufficient facts to
charge the defendant with involuntary manslaughter or with any other crime. In answer to
this statement, we would merelv call to counsel's
attention the fact that the original complaint and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the information as filed in this case were filed under the reformed procedure which has been adopted in this State, and that, therefore, cases defining
what is necessary under the earlier procedure may
not be controlling herein. In order to get the
matter properly before us, and to see what our
statute requires, we would like to quote the provisions of the 1935 Laws of Utah, which set up the
form of procedure.
Section 105-21-8, Chapter 118, Laws of
Utah, 1935, p. 223 provides:
"(1) The information or indictment may
charge, and is valid and sufficient if it
charges the offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted in one or more of
the following ways:
'' (a) By using the name given to the
offense by the common law or by a
statute. . . . ''
Section 105-21-47 of Chapter 118, Laws of
Utah, 1935, p. 228 provides as follows:
''The following forms may be used in the
cases in which they are applicable: . . .
"Manslaughter C. D. . . . "

A. B. unlawfully killed

In the complaint as filed before the magistrate, it
was charged that Jesse Anderson, on the 25th day
of February, 1940, at the County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, did commit the crime of involuntary
manslaughter. . . .
If nothing more had been said in the complaint,
this would have been in direct compliance ·with paragraph (a) of Subsection 1 of Section 105-21-8,
~upra. The defendant, thereby, was charged with
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a crime by using the name which has been legally
given to that crime, both by common law and by
statute. The defendant complains because the
original complaint did not stop with the charge of
the crime under the common law or statutory name,
but went further and alleged specific facts. We
call attention to the wording of Subsection 1 of Section 105-21-8, where it provides that the charge is
valid and sufficient if it charges the offense in *'one or more of the ways designated.
There has been more charged in the complaint as
originally filed than was absolutely necessary under
paragraph (b) ; but that should not invalidate the
charge of the crime under its common law or statutory name even if what follows thereafter is not
sufficient to make out a charge of the crime in a different way. There is nothing in the balance of the
complaint which negatives the fact that the defend_
unt committed the crime charged, and nothing
appears inconsistent with his having committed the
crime.
Counsel argues that by the particular statement in
the latter part of the original complaint, the effect
of the prior charge under the term ''involuntary
manslaughter" is nullified, and he cites the case
of State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91; 262 P. 987, both from
its original report and as quoted in the case of
·Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 80 Utah 138; 13 P.
( 2d) 636, to the effect that where specific a.llegations are in conflict with general allegations, the
specific allegations will control. However, counsel
fails to point out where the specific allegations ill
this case are in conflict with the g·eneral allegations. The case of State v. Rolio, cited by counsel,
in itself shows that the contention of conl)<:;()1 ('annot prevail in this case. In that case, the State
iiled a snit to qniet the title to certain land borderSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing Utah Lake. In the con1plaint, the State alleged
gL'llerally its ownership of the land. 'rhe complaint
then went on to allege specificaHy that the State,
in it~ sovereign capacity upon its admission into the
Union as a State, became the owner in fee of and
"·as entitled to possession of all lands underlying
navigable water within the State, that the land in
question at the time the State was admitted was
covered by the water of Utah Lake; but that since
said time, the water of the lake has receded awl
the land in question had become "unwatered'' or
dry land, suitable for farn1ing.
The Court in that case did state that where title is
alleged in general terms and then specific facts an~
alleged, the specific averments may be regarded as
controlling, if they are inconsistent with the general
allegations. The Court discussed the connection
between the general and specific allegations in that
complaint and then stated:
''Thus, the general allegations in the complaint as to the State's title and ownership
are in no particular impaired, but strengthened by the further allegations as to the
;State's source of title."
In the case at bar, there is no conflict or inconsistency between a general statement or charge that
Jesse Anderson did commit the crime of involuntary
manslaughter, and the subsequent factual allegations to the effect that Jesse Anderson killed Clark
Romney without malice contrary to the provisions
of the statute of the State, etc.
The words "contrary tcf the provisions of the statute'' are in effect the same as ''Jesse Anderson
killed Clark Romney unlawfully,'' or ''A. B. killed
·c. D. contrary to law.'' The words contrary to
statute or contrary to law and the word unlawfully
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have the same meaning. By Section 105-21-47, supra,
the State can properly charge the crime of manslaughter either voluntary or involuntary merely
by stating: "A. B. unlawfully killed C. D."
At the oral argument the suggestion was made that
these words ''contrary to the provisions of the
statute,'' etc., were a necessary part of the inforJnation and could not be used as supplying the
word ''unlawfully.'' Those words are not otherwise necessary in this -complaint.
Chapter 143, Laws of Utah, 1937.
Chapter 118, Section 105-21-6 and 7, Laws
of Utah, 1935.
In effect, the charge as it was originally filed before
the magistrate charged the defendant with the crime
of involuntary manslaughter in ''one or more'' of
the ways provided and prescribed by
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935.
It charged the defendant with the crime "by using
the name given to the offense by the common law
or by statute," as allowed by Section 8 and it
charged the same crime in the form provided by
Section 47. The two modes were in no manner inconsistent, but, as was stated in the case of State
v. Rolio, the general allegation was not impaired by
the specific statement that followed, but, if any
thing, was strengthened thereby, and clearly there
was no inconsistency between the two.

ARGUMENT NUMBER II.

We admit as good law the cases and authorities
cited by counsel under hiR se-cond proposition on
pages 9 and 10 of his brief. His argument there,
however, proceeds upon the erroneous assumption
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that the co1nplaint before the n1agistrate was not
sufficient and that, therefore, the defendant had
not had a proper prelinlinary hearing. What we
haYe ~tated under the heading Argun1ent I hereinaboYe as well as what follows hereinafter in auS\Yer to defendant's argument under his third proposition, we feel is a sufficient answer to show that
the defendant's premise is wrong, and while we
admit his authorities as good law, we most urgently
insist that the defendant was properly charged hefore the magistrate and was given a proper preliminary hearing. The complaint complied sufficiently with the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The defendant was advised thereIn with respect to the charge brought against him.
Tn addition to that, the defendant had the right to
demand a bill of particulars if he wanted a detailed
statement of the facts involved in the charge. He
made such a demand and was furnished with a bill
of particulars giving him a detailed statmnent of
the facts for his henefit upon the prelilninary
hearing. The trial court, therefor~, did not err in
denying the motion to qn::tsh, and the district attorney did have full authority to file thp infonnatjon
in the cause.

ARGUMENT Nill.fBEH III.
'rhe matters set forth in defendant's brief in arguing on his third proposition are very similar to
those set forth in his argument under the first proposition. On pages 10 and 11, counsel argues that
the information did not advise the defendant of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
defendant does not, under this hef}ding, set forth
the Constitutional provision, but he is evidently attacking the procedurr adopted in and prescribed by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Chapter 118, Laws of Utah, 1935 upon Constitutional grounds. rrhis reformed procedure has already been attacked in previous cases before this
Court, and we really feel that it is unnecessary to
repeat the arguments cited in some of the briefs already filed on behalf of the State in those cases.
The defendant does not state under his argument
3 whether or not, in his opinion, the information
complies with or meets the requirements of Chapter
118, Laws of Utah, 1935. But a comparison with
the statute as quoted supra reveals that it would
be hard to draw an information which would meet
the requirements of the statute more fully than the
one involved here does. As we pointed out above,
a statement that A. B. unlawfully killed C. D., a~
far as the meaning of the words are concerned and
in legal effect, is no different from a statement
charging that A. B. killed C. D. contrary to law or
contrary to the provisions of the statutes of the
State of Utah. If it is done contrary to the provisions of a statute, it is'done unlawfully becau~e it i~
done contrary to law. The word "unlawfully"
appears in the information. Thus, we respectfully
urge that both the complaint before the magistrate
and the infonnation filed hv the district attorney
fully comp,ly with the sho~t- form Iprocedure set
forth in Chapter 18, Laws of Utah, 1935.
With respect to the Constitutional question, we will
merely repeat what has been stated in previous
briefs before this Court. This reformed procerlure
has been adopted by our State Legislature along
with the legislatureR of various other States in the
Union after lengthy and detailed study on the
matter, by and upon repommendation of the American Law Institute.
The argument advanced by defendant on pag-eR 10
and 11 of his brief hy a mere repetition reveals itR
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absurdity. Counsel argues that the defendant cannot tell ··whether he is charged with involuntary or
\·oluntary n1anslaughter," and, further, "we ret-pectfully submit that the defendant in this case
should have been advised in the information sufficient facts to determine whether he is being charged
with voluntary or involuntary manslaughter . . . ''
When such arguments are advanced, it is no wonder that the lay members of the public become disgusted with the "technicalities" urged and argued
by legal minds, and with the "hocus pocus'' which
still exists and is practiced in the trial of law suits.
The defendant was clearly informed that he wa:-;
charged with involuntary manslaughter because on
a certain day, at a certain place, he killed a man unlawfully, although without malice. If the defendant
could logically argme that this isn't sufficient to in·
form him as to the charge placed against him, he
could just as logically a:rgne that he does not know
what he has to meet, unless the State be -compelled
to include and set forth in its compJaint every bit
of detail of evidence \Yhich it expects to introduee
at the trial.
One of the earliest cases upholding this reformed.
procedure repeats wHh approval some particular
remarks of a Nmv York Commi~.sioner, concerningthe absurdities and artificialities of the tecimical
procedure foilowed in the past, and which counsel
for the defendant, "-rith others, is still trying to cling
to in order to provide a technical loophole for his
client to crawl thrnnr~h.
People v. Bo,?-"danoff, 254 N. Y. lG; 171
N. E. 890; 69 A. L. R. 1~7R:
''They are not igmorant of the fact that
their proposed reform will strike at the root
of a system artifjcial and absurd in itself.
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and which is only saved from the contempt it 1nerits, by the frequent use of the
names of venerable legal authorities, under
whose sanction it has grown and ripened
into maturity . . . Nor will they allow
themselves to believe that absurdities and
fictions so glaring and gross in themselves
as to provoke the laughter and contempt of
the intelligent, will be perrnitted to continue longer than until a safe substitute for
them can be found.''
We have been unable to find any case holding the
short-form procedure unconstitutional; but we refer the Court to the following cases, which are o
few of the cases in which the question has been
raised:
People v. Brady, 272 Ill. 401; 112 N. E.
126; Ann. Cs. 1918 C. 540 (1916).
State v. Roy, 40 N. M. 397; 60 Pac. (2d)
646; 116 A. L. R. 110.
State v. Engler, 217 Iowa 138; 251 N. W.
88.
State v. Keturokis, 2'24 Iowa 491; 276 N. W.
600 (1937).
Hurd v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 880; 165
S. E. 536.
Dealy v. United States, 152 U. S. 539; 38
L. Ed. 545; 14 Sup. Ct. 680. (1893).
State v. Continental Purchasing Company,
Inc., 119 N. J. L. 257; 195 Atl. 827
(1938).
People v. Busick, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 315;
89 Pac. (2d) 657 (1939).
State v. Domanski, 57 Rhode Island 500;
190 Atl. 854 (1937).
~tate v. Capaci, 179 La. 462; 143 So. 417.
Rosenberg- v. State, 212 Wis. 434; 249 N. W.
541 (1933).
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\t may be here noted that the proyisions of
Article 1, Seetion 12 of the U tnh State Constitution
do not require that the details of the nature and
cause of the accusation against the defendant be included in a complaint or information. The Constitution merely provides that he has the right to
demand (which includes the right to receive) information and facts giving the nature and cause of
the accusation. The la"' in question makes it Inan'1atory that the defendant he given details in a hill
of particulars, if demanded- the Con8titutlon on1v
gives the defendant the right to demand - and if
not demanded the Court may still order it to hPgiven.

\Ve confidently conclude that the provisions of :our
statutes setting up this short-form of procedure do
not conflict with any of thP provisions of our State
Constitution.

ARGUlVIENT NUMBER IV.
In his fourth point, counsel for the appellant asserts
that since the Bill of Particulars alleged that· the
defendant was driving his automobile at a da~ger
ous and excessive speed, and that the defendant did
not stop at a stop. sign, it was i~cumbent on the
court to instruct the jury that they must find that
both of these acts cooperated in causing the death
of Clark Romney. lie points out that instructions
number five and six and six-A permitted the_ jury
to convict the defendant if they determined that
any one of the said acts caused the death of Clark
Romney. He also points out that his requested inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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structions number one and two raised this point,
and that the court should have given those instructions. Under this argument, he also contends that
the Stipulation, as he terms it, found at Record 235
to 237 inclusive, was a further limitation on the
court in this regard.
In the first place, this was not a Stipulation. The
colloquy between court and counsel occurred at the
tilne that the attorney for the defendant requested
a further Bill of Particulars, and in determining
whether or not that further Bill should be given, the
District Judge noted that he did not believe the
court would permit the Sta.te to prove any facts,
which were not specifically alleged in their Bill of
Particulars, and with this statement, counsel for
the State agreed. Counsel for the State pointed
out that the State would ask that the proposition
of reckless driving be put to the jury, but that reck_
tess driving would consist only of the two acts, that
~s, excessive speed and failing to stop at a stop sign.
In other 'W Qrds, this, colloquy only went to the
question of what evidence the State would be permitted to prove under the Bill of Particulars and
certainly was not a limitation at that time upon the
proof yet to be offered during1 the t:r:ial of the case.
Counsel for the State stated the proposition in th~
conjunctive, just as he set forth the three acts of
reckless driving, excessive speed, and going through
a stop sign, in the Bill of Particulars.
Counsel for the defendant relies upon the case of
State v. Vance, 38 Utah 1; 110 Pac. 434, a.'s sustaining his argument that the court, in its instructions~
should have required the jury to find that all the
acts set forth in the Bill of Particulars cooperatecl
in causing the death of Clark Romney, and appar·
ently contends that if the death were caused by ex~
c>rssive speeding alone, that his client is not guilty.
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The Vance case does not sustain any such prop·
osition.
.As originally filed, the lnfor1nation in the Vance
case contained three counts charging the defendant
with n1urder in each count. The first count alleged
that the defendant, by poisoning the deceased, com·
mitted murder. In the second count the Information alleged that the murder was committed by kicking and beating the deceased. The third count al~
leged that the poisoning of the deceased took place
on one day, the kicking and heating· of the deceased
occurred on another day, and that the two cause~
tog·ether resulted in the death of the deceased. The
State distnissed the first two counts, and went to
the jury on the third count alone. It should also l)e
pointed out in this connection that the proof of the
State showed that the two causes cooperated to~
g-ether and resulted in the death of the deceased and
did not singly cause her death. The court in that
case points out that if the Information had properl.~
alleged the poisoning and kicking and beating as
causes of death, they could have relied on each of
these. The Court stated:
''If the pleader had desired to rely on the
two causes separately as well as upon their
combined effect. he easily could have done
so by stating in one count that the means
u~0d hy the appeJlant to kill were heating-,
kicking, bruising. and by administering
poison, and by any othPr means which the
nleader thought the evidence might show
were used."
'rne Bill of Particulars in the case at bar conforms
to this last quotation from the oninion in the Vance
casP. The statement is that the defendant while
driving recklessly and [lt an excessive speed anrl
without stopping at a stop sign, collided with the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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car of Clark Romney, from which the said Romney
sustained injuries and fr01n which he died. We
submit that under the Vance case, it was permissible for the court, under this Bill of Particulars,
to instruct the jury that if any one or all of said
acts caused the death of Clark Ron1ney, they could
find the defendant guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter.
In the two Utah cases of
State v. Rasmussen. 92' Utah 357; 68
(2d) 176 and
State v. Johnson, 76 Ut. 84; 287 P. 909.
this Court indicated that where allegations were in
the conjunctive in the Information, the Trial Court
can give the type of instruction which was here
given. Both of the:;;e latter cases are Involuntary
J\1anslaughter cases.
In the case of
State v. Jones, 81 Utah fj03; 20 Pac. (2d)
6141 and
State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274; 72 Pac. (2d)
656.
it is held that where a charge of Forgery is in the
conjunctive, towit: That the defendant did make
and pass the check in question, a conviction of For·
gery can he had upon proof of either or both such
making and passing. In
Smith v. State, 186 Ind. 252; 115 N. E. 9~t3,
the defendant was charged with Involuntary Manslaughter. The second count alleged that the defendant violated the speed statute and drove while
under the influence of liquor. The Court held that
this count was not duplicitous because it charged
one offense~ that. is, Inyoluntary ~!anslaughter.
The defendant also contended on appeal that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
trial court, by its instructions, improperly perInitted the conviction of the defendant under this
count on proof that the accident was the result of
defendant's intoxiration alone.
The Supren1e
Court held that such instructions were not in error,
and that proof of either one of these acts, thus
alleged would sustain the conviction of the defendant.
The case of
Thompson v. State, 41 \Vyo. 72; 283 Pac.
151,
is another :.\Ianslaughter case. The Court there
held that where the offense may be committed in ·
one of several ways, the Information in one count
may charge the commission in any one or all of the
ways specified in the statutes, and if not incon~istent, and proof of either of the ways will sustain
eonviction, the State need not elect. In
People v. Von Eckartsberg, 133 Cal. App.
1; 23 P. (2d) 819,
the defendant was charged with Involuntary Manslaughter and contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The Court
pointed out that there were three traffic law violations upon which the conviction could be based -speed, reckless driving and driving on the wrong
side of the road. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the last traffic violation mentioned
and held that this was enough to support the conviction. In
Gore v. State, 2·5 Okl. Cr. 214; 219 P. 153,
the Court had a situation hPfore it that came within the rule herein quoted from State v. Vance,
supra. In that case the defendant was charged
with having murdrred tJ:e victint by· burning and
f:hooting, hut one tran~action was involved, and the
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Court held that there could be a conviction on either
or both of the alleged burning and shooting.
We submit that under the foTegoing authorities,
the court clearly instructed the jury that the defendant could be convicted if he viola.ted any one or
more of the statutes set forth in the instruction, if
the act in violation of said statute evinced a marked
disregard for the rights and safety of others.

ARGUMENT NUlVIBER V.
Under this division of his brief, ·counsel for the
appellant contends that the State's expert Seymour
S. Taylor based his opinion on the speed of the de·
fendant 's automobile at the time of the collision on
facts other than those proven in the case or observations made by the expert himself. Counsel sets
out portions of the abstract on the examination of
Mr. Taylor wherein he claims that Taylor admitted
using information outside or' the record or his own
personal observation. It will be noted th~t the
italicized portion of the abstract found at page 43,
purporting to reflect the record on page 178 is not
correct. Counsel apparently gets the italicized portion from the following question and answer on that
page of the record.

'' Q. The opinion you have given is taking
into consideration certain information 11(r.
Pierce gave you at some other time~
"A. I read the statement of the witneRses 1w has jn his police report.''
That is not a direct statement that he used, in
reaching his opinion, evidence other than was introduced in the case. What Mr. Taylor was un~
doubtedly referring to was the fact that previous
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to the trial, he had worked out the mathematical
calculations, and in doing so, had received eertain
inforination fro1n the police report. However it is
the contention of the State that all of the items
upon which he based his opinion were introduced
in evidence or personal observations were 1nade
by Taylor himself. From a consideration of Tay~
lor's entire testimony, this last statement is obviously correct.
Mr. Taylor stated on pages 155-156 of the record
(page 34 of the abstract) that he divided his problem into two main propositions - first, the decrease of speed of the defendant's automobile pre~
vious to the point of impact, and second, the decrease of speed after the impact and until the defendant's autmnobile came to a complete stop.
In the first propositions relative to the decrease
of speed before impact, the witness Taylor took
into consideration the length of the skid marks
which appeared at the intersection together with
the coefficient of friction between the tires and th8
pavement. Officer Pierce testified that the tire
marks were 44 feet long and that all four wheels
were locked. (See Record 111-112; Ab. 21). As
the coefficient, Taylor used .7. Taylor looked over
the scene of the accident, and from his experience
in determining the coefficient of friction, decided
that .7 was the correct one to use. It is true that
he did not see the intersection until one or two days
after the acl'ident. but Officer Pierce also made
calculations in connPdion with the decrease in
speed caused by the skid mark~. Hnd he nserl this
same coefficient after an examination of the inter~ection immediatelv aftf~r the accident occurred(Record 135). At .Record 165, Taylor pointed out
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ing at the decrease of speed under proposition number one, and that the formula he used had been
accepted generally in the United States.
Based in these items, which were either in evidence,
or came from his personal observation, he gave it
as his opinion that the speed of the car was de
creased 30.5 miles per hour by the skid marks. (See
Record 146). In connection with this matter, it
should he noted that Officer Pierce testified that
the speed was de·creased 30.35 miles per hour by
the skid marks, and the evidence came in without
objection. (See Record 119-120).
4

Taylor then stated that he took into consideration
under the second proposition relative to the decrease of speed after impact, five different things.
rrhe first was the extent of the damage done to the
Ford car of the defendant and ~econd the damage
done to the Oldsmobile car. Taylor personally examined both automobiles, identified the automobiles from exhibits which had been identified by
persons at the scene of the accident and at the time
thereof. Taylor called upon the experience which
he had had in investigating and watehing collisions
between automobiles in determining· the energy expended by the defendant's car in damage to. the
Oldsmobile car. These considerations were a matter of personal observ·ation l)y th~_, exn(·rt.
The third consideration was the amount of energy
involved in forcing the Oldsmobile (driven by the
deceased) to the pavement so that it leaped into
the air. The energy involved in bringing about this
result and its translation into decrease of speed
· in miles per hour was based upon the height which
the Oldsmobile was forced into the air and its
weight. On the proposition of weight, Mr. Tayloe
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took the shipping \Yeight of both automobiles, the
Ford car being 2927 pound8, and the Oldsmobile
3185 pounds. l\Lr. Taylor used the figure three feet
as being the height that the Oldsmobile ·reached.
The witness Alex Engstrom testified that the Oldsmobile went into the air about five or six feet. (see
Record 73 and 83). The witness Kenneth H. Silcox
stated that the Oldsmobile went into the air about
five or six feet (see Record 99 and 100). It might
be pointed out to the Court tha.t Taylor testified
that the one witness' testimony which he read said
fiye or six feet, but that he used three feet (see
Record 187). This indicates the extent to which
outside information was used by Mr. Taylor. The
two witnesses testified to the very facts which :Mr.
Taylor took into consideration, and he figured tlu:)
heighth less than either witness testified to.
The fourth consideration was the amount of energy
involved in forcing the Oldsmobile from its intended path to a path 10 feet distant. Exhibit 0 is drawn
to scale and shows that the Oldsmobile was forced in
a northwesterly direction 21 feet before it ~truck
the gTound. By using the scale set forth on the
diagram of Exhibit C, it appears that the distance
north that the Oldsmobile travelled before again
striking the ground is over ten feet. The items of
this com;ideration were clearly in eviden~e.
The fifth consideration under this proposition is
the energy involved by the moveinent of the Ford .
after the impact to its position of rest. Officer
Pierce testifjpd to the ~kid marks 14 feet in length
and which were made by the defendant's Ford
automobile. These considerationR and propositions are set out in the wi.tncs~cs' testimony at
Record 155 and 15G, Abstract Pag-e 34.
We submit that the matters taken into consideration by the expert Taylor were either introduced in
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evidence or were personally observed by him. We
point out to the Court that the defendant does not
in any way question the qualifications of Mr. Taylor as an expert to testify to the thing s to which
he did testify. The witness went thoroughly into
the things which he took into consideration, and
the manner in which he determined the speed of the
defendant's automobile. All this was before the
jury and the weight to be given to the question of
speed which he gave was a question for the jury.
There certainly coukl. be no prejudicial error here1

ARGUMENT NUMBER VI.
Under this numbered argument defendant's counsel contends that the State was limited to the acts
of excessive rate of speed towit, forty miles per
hour and failing to stop at a stop sign, as the basis
for a conviction of Involuntary Manslaughter, and
he sets out at length instruction number five given
by the court. It should he noted that the laws set
out as first and second in said instruction is a
break-down of the reckless driving statute into two
parts.
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section
57-7-15.
The third and fourth statutes set out are the two
definitions of speeding as contained in the statutes.
Laws of Utah, 1935, Ch. 48, Section 57-7-16.
The statute indicated as fifth was the statute fEllating to stop signs. As heretofore indicated, tlw
Bill of Particulars as well as the statement by counsel for the State indicated to the defendant that the
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:State would rely upon rerldP~~ driving, excessive
t::peeding and running a stop sign. The reckless
driving would be nmde up only of the acts of speed~
ing and running a stop sign. The court then in
instruction number six stated that if the jury found
that the defendant violated any of the foregoing
provisions of the statutes in such a manner as to
eYinee marked disregard for the safety of others,
the defendant could be found guilty of manslaughter. These instructions were taken from the
opinion of this Court in
State v. Lingemen, 97 Utah 180; 91 J>.
(2d) 457.
Counsel contevds that these instructions permitted
the jury to speculate on numerous grounds of recklessness not set forth in the Bill of Particulars.
Counsel also admits in his hdef on pages 18 and
19 that there was no evidence introduced other than
the acts of failing to stop at the stop sign and the
speed at which the car was travelling. The jury
was instructed in instruction number 11, set out
at abstract page 65, that it was their hnperative
and sworn duty to hear and determine the case on
the testimony of the witnesses given on the trial
and that in determining mwstjons of fact, they were
not at liberty to indulge in conjectures not based on
evidence introduced in the case, and it was nointed
out to the jury that they should look solely to the
evidence for the facts and to the instructions given
by the court for the law, and to return a verdict
according to the facts established by the evidence
and law -laid down by the court. <:ertainly this
Court cannot say that the ~ury did not folhw the
in~trnrtions p-ivrn hv tl1P ~ourt and l":l.FlPG their vArdict on som~thing that was not in evidence. The
~Hate din not go oni"~idc nf tlw Bill 0f Particulars
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in proving its case, and counsel tor the defendant
admits this.
ln view of this state of the record, it is difficult
~o see how counsel could say that paragraph two of
instruction number five would permit the jury to
determine that the defendant drove his car without
due caution and circumspection, regardless of
whether h~ violated any speed law or failed to stop
at the stop sign, when these two facts were the only
ones introduced in evidence
Under this numbered argument, counsel also -contends that it was necessary for the State to prove
a speed in excess of forty miles an hour under its
Bill of Particulars. The Bill of Par'ticulars stated
that defendant drove into an intersection at a dangerous and excessive speed, towit, in excess of forty
miles per hour. The statement that this speed was
dangerous and excessive ~hows that the State intended to charge a violation of the speeding laws of
this State. Certainly any speed which violated
these laws was an act which, if done in a manner
that evinced a mar]red disregard for the safety of
others, would sustain a conviction of Involuntary
Manslaughter. The State would not he limited to
a speed in excess of forty miles, hut any speed
which constitutes a violation of the speed laws
would be sufficient. In civil cases where a speed in
miles per hour is alleged, the pleader is not limited
to proof of such a speed. See
Waller v. Graff, (Mo. App.), 251 S. W. 733.
Debes v. Greenstone, (Tex.), 260 S. W. 211.
Morrison v. Antwine, (Tex.), 51 S. W. (2d)
820.
White v. Zell, (Iowa), 276 N. W. 76.
Hall v. Ponder, (Ga.), 179 S. E. 2'43.
Alendal v. Madsen, 275 N. W. 352.
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Instructions on speed in the words of statutes sinlilar to that in the State of Utah have been held suf~
ficiently specific without requiring the jury to find
that the automobile in question was going at an~;
particular speed in miles per hour.
Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34; 130 N. W. 972;
33 L. R. A. ( K. S.) 403 ; Ann. Cas. 1912
c 495.
PeopJe v. Marconi, 118 Cal. App. 683; 5 P.
(2d) 974.
People v. Von Eckartsberg, Supra.
We submit that there was no error in the instructions given.

ARGUMENT NUMBER VII.
Under this argument, counsel for the appellant in
part reiterates some arguments heretofore made
and which we have answered.
He relies upon the court's refusal to give the defendant's requested instruction number seven. In
that request he wanted it pointed out to the jury
that in districts outside of business or residence
districts, that speed at all times should be reasonable and safe under the general circumstances prevailing on the highways, providing that such speed
should not exceed fifty miles per hour. In so far
as this part of the instruction is co.ncerned, the
court placed no limit upon the speed at which the
defendant could drive his automobile, so long as it
was a safe and reasonahle speed within the pro~
visions of the law as set forth in instruction number five. Counsel certainly cannot object to a fail~
ure to place a top limit on the speed at which the
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defendant travelled. He then defines the business
district as territory so designated by local authorities, and clearly defined by signs posted on the
highway at the limit of said district on the high~
way, and the residence district being the territory
in cities and towns other than business districts.
Under the Stipulation of eounsel, which appears at
Record 206, Abstract 54, it appears that the sbuth
line of 21st South Street is the end of Salt Lake
City limits, and that the land south of that line is
in Salt Lake County. The accident occurred within
Salt Lake City since it was within the intersection
of 3rd East and 21st South, which appears from
this Stipulation, to be within Salt Lake City, and
under the definition given by counsel in this requested instruction, the speed of fifty miles per
hour is not applicable.
The defendant's requested instructions numbers
nine, ten, and twelve were merely different ways
of stating the disregard which defendant's conduct
should evince before a conviction could be had. 1.1-,or
instance in number nine, counsel requests that we
jury must find a calloused disregard of human life,
and in number ten, that the acts of the defendant
must be done P.ither with a wilful intent to injure,
or that recklessness and wanton disregard of the
rights and safety of another as would be equivalent
to an intent to injure, and in number twelv~, that
the act be with a wilful and wanton disregard for
the rights of others. The words of the Lingeman
case are that the conduct must evince a marked disregard for the safety of others, and this was the
language used by the court in its instructions.
No error was made in refusing these requests.
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ARGU.Jl H~Nrl, NVl\fBER VIII.

Counsel under this argument contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict of guilty
rendered by the jury. . It is .the position of the
State that the question of the defendant's guilt was
one of fact which was. properly left to the jury
under the facts of this case.
State v. Lingeman, Supra.
The evidence shows that the defendant, while in u
hurry to get his girl hnme at 7 :00 A. lVI. in the morning, drove his automobile into the intersection of
3rd East and 21st South without stopping at a. stop
sign, which he should have done, at a speed of between forty and fifty-nine miles per hour, and ran
into the automobile of Clark Romney, thereby
causing his death.
We submit that it takes no argument tnat sucn conduct violated the heretofore mentioned statutes of
the State of Utah, and tha.t his conduct in doing
this evinced a marked disregard for the safety of
others. Counsel argues that there was not much
traffic on the hig·hway. There was certainly enough
traffic on the highway to require the defendant to
act differently than he did. The deceased's car
was on the highway, a.s well as the automobile of
the witness Silcox. Defendant might well have
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expected some traffic to be on the highway and
especially at an intersection marked by a stop sigu.

CONCLUSION
We submit that we have answered all of the arguments of counsel that there is no error in the record, and certainly nothing transpired prejudicial
to the rights of the defendant.
We therefore submit that the verdict and judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney General of Utah
A. U. MINER,
Assistant Attorney General
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS,
District Attorney,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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